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The British Mandate in Palestine has captured the attention of countless scholars who 
have built a substantial body of work focused on this chapter in history. Many of their accounts 
have addressed the economy of the region, the sectarian communities of Jews and Muslims, and 
the British imperial structures that governed the territory.1 However, less frequent are the 
attempts to elaborate the intersection of class interests, political practice, and cultural identity 
within the Palestinian Arab community in a way that effectively illustrates how intra-communal 
hierarchies were necessary to the formation and conservation of the British Mandate.2 This paper 
synthesizes methods used to study political economy and state power to unpack key aspects of 
the intra-communal hierarchy of Palestinian Arabs and to situate this stratification within the 
dynamic milieu of Palestine during the 1920s and 1930s. Particularly, the paper highlights how 
capitalist development exacerbated the intra-communal hierarchy within the Palestinian Arab 
community and, as a result, produced divergent and even conflicting forms of political activity 
and cultural identity. A major consequence of the uneven incorporation of Palestinian Arabs into 
the Mandate’s hegemony is that it precluded an indigenous Palestinian nationalism from gaining 
the necessary traction to effectively challenge both the British and the Zionists.  
A political economy framework is imperative for this project.3  It allows for a 
reconceptualization of Palestine during the first half of the twentieth century that does not 
presume the primacy of sectarian strife as a defining aspect of this history. In contemporary 
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politics, nationalist narratives promoted by both Jews and Palestinians emphasize these sectarian 
divides in their historical interpretations. However, these narratives have been shaped and 
reshaped through the contentious sequence of events that occurred after the termination of the 
British Mandate, most notably the creation of Israel and the Nakba, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, 
and the sequence of intifadas. Thus, to presume that sectarian groups of Palestinians, Jews, and 
British were inherently antagonist to one another in the 1920s and 1930s would be to skew 
history in a presentist manner. These interpretations appear in scholarship on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, usually adopting the colonialist narrative of British vs. Arabs or an ethnic/religious 
narrative of Jews vs. Palestinians/Muslim.4  Political economy complicates the sectarian 
approach that considers these social barriers as historical absolutes. It illuminates intra-
communal hierarchies and the various forms of political and economic interests spread across 
differentiated strata of Palestinian Arabs. Additionally, political economy recenters power by 
elaborating how privileged Palestinian Arabs promoted and acted on their own material interests 
in society. The colonialist and ethnic narratives treat the Palestinian Arab community as a group 
that is powerless and non-instrumental vis-à-vis the West in the historical process.5 However, 
when the political economy of the Mandate is looked at closely, the distinctions made in 
conventional narratives between the British and Palestinian Arabs, as well as between Palestinian 
Arabs and Jews, become suspect.  
 Specific insights from historians who use a political economy framework to study the 
Middle East more broadly are instructive in applying this paradigm to Mandate Palestine. Joel 
Beinin attentively defines the political economy of the Middle East as an interdisciplinary 
approach that examines the consistent reproduction of institutions and systems of power through 
social struggle. Moreover, the hierarchies of power in which these struggles occur are buttressed 
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by the ruling class’s efforts to obscure the mechanisms that propel the system.6 As in other works 
by historians taking a Marxist approach, the assumption in this paper is that, like all modern 
societies, the British Mandate in Palestine was a classed society embroiled in universal dynamics 
of social struggle.7 Exploring class dynamics within the Palestinian Arab community under the 
Mandate, Sherene Seikaly illustrates the relationship between Palestinian Arab businessmen 
known as “men of capital” and the overall economic development of the Mandate, a relationship 
that had stark implications on the discursive tools this business class employed to articulate 
notions of progress, identity, and economic behavior.8 Other scholars have similarly unpacked 
the complex dynamic between capitalist development, consumerism, class formation, and class 
stratification within the British Mandate.9 The insights drawn from these political economy-
based interventions contradict the image of a passive and separate Palestinian subject and firmly 
reveal an undeniable role of active Palestinian Arabs in the formation and maintenance of the 
British Mandate. 
 Although political economy has a glaring impact on the way power is constructed and 
wielded in each society, cultural factors must not be ignored.10 To merge the insights of political 
economy with the interpretations of social dynamics within the intra-communal hierarchy of 
Palestinian Arabs, the theories of Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci prove valuable. Treating 
the British Mandate as a state structure that is an integral and active piece of the story of 
capitalist development in the territory allows one to break with the economism that plagues 
orthodox Marxist interpretations of history.11 Some historians have emphasized the role of the 
state in Mandate Palestine.12 Gramsci’s theory on the state exposes its connection to the world of 
production and details the tools at the state’s disposal (ex. the law, police, schools). These tools 
are brandished by the ruling class of a society and the intellectuals who promote the agenda of 
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the ruling class in order to not only regulate the economy but to organize social relations through 
the elaboration and dissemination of a form of culture that serves to maintain the power of the 
ruling class itself.13 The consent of the masses to the ruling class’s narratives and institutions 
secures a hegemony. As a result, the state becomes a comprehensive entity that uses cultural 
hegemony to shroud and evade class conflict. 
The colonial state that the British established in Palestine is distinct in many ways from 
the European state that Gramsci theorized. The most obvious way is the explicitly external forces 
of political and economic interventions into the region.14 However, in line with Gramsci’s notion 
of hegemony, culture is just as instructive in domination, a topic that has been greatly explored 
by postcolonial scholars.15 In the case of Palestine, the British used culture as a lens through 
which to view and structure society. They perceived Jewish Zionists and Palestinian Arabs as 
necessarily separate groups, both subsumed under the authority of the British and subjected to 
different policy prescriptions.16 Although it is important to note that Zionists and Palestinian 
Arabs constructed their own cultural identities prior to the Mandate, the British colonial regime 
was based on a similar cultural hierarchy. Thus, the state as a political, economic, and cultural 
actor intersected with imperialism, the latter aspect having a direct bearing on how the British 
administered Palestine and other colonial projects. The type of hegemony elaborated within the 
Mandate sought to develop capitalism as well as maintain the discursive construction of 
culturally defined barriers between Jews, Arabs, and British. Palestinian Arabs who were 
incorporated into civil society maintained these social barriers which not only advanced their 
own economic security and political campaigns against the British, but simultaneously 
substantiated the imperial paradigm on which the Mandate’s hegemony was established. 
Through this form of cultural organization, class conflict could be averted.  
5 
 
Synthesizing the approaches of political economy and cultural hegemony, this paper 
analyzes the various positions and roles of Palestinian Arabs in the larger political economy 
during the 1920s and 1930s, considering their participation within and/or resistance to the British 
Mandate. During this period, particularly during the 1920s, elite Palestinian Arabs were able to 
materially benefit in certain ways within the political economy of the Mandate. These benefits 
often came at the expense of the Palestinian peasantry, who comprised the majority of the 
Palestinian population. Further, the political and cultural narratives used by Palestinian Arabs to 
challenge the British during the more embattled period of the 1930s reflected their own class 
positions within the political economy of the Mandate. However, the dominant movement in 
Palestine against colonization at this time was primarily led by the privileged classes of 
Palestinian Arabs. As such, their Arab nationalist movement was tinged with class biases 
stemming from the inherent attributes of capitalist development, particularly consumerism, 
urbanization, and scientific reasoning.17 This dynamic prompted the professional and political 
classes to overlook the material sources of the peasantry’s marginalization. These oversights can 
be observed in not only the Palestinian Arab professionals’ and elites’ understandings of the 
economy but the political and cultural identifications of themselves within an aggressively 
polarized setting that became increasingly contentious during the 1930s.  
As a result, the economic relationship between privileged Palestinians and the British 
Mandate induced the Palestinian Arab professional and elite classes to produce certain types of 
political action and cultural narratives that complemented their efforts to secure their positions in 
Palestinian society. The Palestinian peasantry forged their own politics and cultural 
understandings to challenge the elites within their own community as well as the British and 
Zionists. However, the intra-communal hierarchy produced incompatible interests amongst the 
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atomized socioeconomic classes of Palestinian Arabs. By the end of the Great Revolt in 1939, 
the uneven incorporation of different classes of Palestinian Arabs into the projects of the British 
Mandate and Arab nationalism solidified the hierarchy in Palestinian society. Ultimately, this 
power dynamic precluded the formation of a unified, indigenous Palestinian movement 
concerned with the material needs of the peasant majority. 
Revisiting the origins of the British Mandate will help elucidate this dynamic. The British 
launched their military campaigns into the Ottoman Middle East during World War I and 
reached a virtual stalemate by 1917. In November of that year, British Foreign Secretary Arthur 
Balfour wrote to leading British Zionist, Lionel Walter Rothschild, explaining that “His 
Majesty’s Government” supported the creation of a Jewish “national home” in Palestine while 
granting “civil and religious rights” to the indigenous population of Palestinian Arabs.18 
Although it was not until June of 1922 that the Mandate was approved by the League of Nations, 
the process of establishing the colonial state became formalized upon Balfour’s declaration. The 
political apparatuses of this state proceeded to function like most other states by granting rights, 
regulating citizenship, and securing territorial boundaries. In this way, viewing the Mandate 
through the lenses of state hegemony is instructive. 
Under the new system, the colonial aspects of state building resulted in explicitly unequal 
treatment of Palestinian Arabs. The British arrogated the role of deciding who was able to enter 
the territory and who was able to become a citizen. Palestinian Arabs who were living abroad for 
various reasons, such as those seeking international business opportunities or fleeing the conflict 
of World War I, found themselves forced to apply for citizenship to their homeland. This was 
intensified after the passage of the Palestine Citizenship Order-In-Council of 1925.19 The strict 
pathway to citizenship was reiterated by High Commissioner Herbert Plumer and entailed that a 
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person must have resided in Palestine for at least two years before applying, must be of “good 
character,” must have knowledge of English, Hebrew and Arabic, and must be committed to 
permanently residing in Palestine.20 Additionally, British policies set minimum wages for Arab 
workers at significantly lower rates than that for Jewish workers.21 
As the Balfour Declaration makes clear, the British did not act alone but with the support 
of Jewish Zionists, who were relocated to Palestine with greater ease than Palestinians living 
abroad. Zionists swayed British imperial policy to achieve this end. A memorandum that 
circulated in the Colonial Office in 1922 regarding the topic of immigration stated that “one of 
the most essential parts of the programme for establishing a Jewish National Home in Palestine 
[is] necessarily a system of organized Jewish Immigration into that country.”22  Subsequent 
legislation granted citizenship to Jewish immigrants in a manner that was “proportioned to the 
[economic] necessities of the country and its ability to absorb and support immigrants.”23 In the 
year 1925, 33,801 out of 34,641 immigrants to Palestine were Jews.24 Jewish Zionists had a 
direct role in facilitating and shaping this process in Mandate Palestine by negotiating the 
entrance of thousands of Jews to support the growing economy. Additionally, through 
organizations such as the Jewish National Fund, Zionists purchased and “redeemed” land in 
Palestine that was then designated as an “inalienable right of the Jewish People” according to the 
1929 Constitution of the Jewish Agency.25 In industrial sectors, Zionists thrived as they sought to 
develop an economy that aligned with British plans for development.26  
The role of Palestinian Arabs in the Mandate’s project is apparent when one considers the 
economic and political interests of the rural notables, who were intertwined with the broader 
economic system of private, commodified property. In Gramscian terms, this stratum had 
irrefutable ties to the world of production. Many of the landowning class of Palestinian Arabs at 
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this time were absentee landlords who resided in the bourgeoning cities. There they enjoyed a 
distinguished socioeconomic status. The mechanized methods of farming that the Zionists 
brought with them allowed the Jewish National Fund to purchase fertile lands from Palestinian 
landowners and develop the land for settlement and cultivation.27 The Palestinian Arab 
landowners, who were not pressured to update their technology, sold their land to the Jewish 
National Fund, facilitating the transfer of land from Arab to Jewish hands.28 Becoming 
increasingly detached from their land as urban areas and civil society expanded, this class of 
Palestinian Arabs facilitated the creation of the British Mandate and its economic development. 
One example includes Abdul Latif Tabawi, a Palestinian who graduated from the British-
installed Arab College in Jerusalem and who served in the Education Department. Tabawi owned 
a swath of land on which Palestinian tenants lived in the Nablus district. These tenants, Tabawi 
claimed, hindered his ability to maintain his lifestyle. Tabawi argued that he should not be 
personally and financially burdened simply because a tenant needed to make a living. The 
district officer permitted Tabawi to evict his tenants.29 Many landowners went through a similar 
process to evict tenants in order to market their land to the prospective Jewish buyers, fueling 
tensions within the intra-communal hierarchy of Palestinian Arabs. 
Citrus cultivation is another striking example of how Palestinian Arabs performed a 
cooperative role within the political economy of the Mandate. The cultivation of oranges in 
Palestine had been occurring for centuries before the British arrived. The industry grew 
dramatically in the mid-nineteenth century as the European market for orange exports, 
particularly those from Jaffa, expanded. This encouraged Arab landowners to pursue profit in the 
global market.30 After World War I, merchants from Bethlehem invested their money into the 
expanding citrus plantations along the coastal plains.31  In 1921, a British report on the economic 
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situation in Palestine notes the progress in the orange and fruit trades by stating that the Jaffa 
Orange Growers’ and Shippers’ Syndicate had been created for export purposes and “had yielded 
good results, and bodes well for the future.”32 At this time, a productive citrus sector was 
developing beautifully, with Palestinian merchants and large landowners playing a vital role. 
Palestinian religious functionaries also played a cooperative role in the development of 
the citrus sector. A 1928 annual report on Palestine conducted by the British notes that large 
areas of waqf (religious endowment) lands were made available for development after 
purportedly being restored for health reasons. The Supreme Muslim Council drained an 
extensive, malaria-ridden swamp on waqf lands in Wadi Rubin, “thus rendering a large tract in a 
fertile orange-growing district available for irrigation and intensive cultivation.”33 The report 
proceeds to explain how the Palestine Jewish Colonisation Association also carried out drainages 
in the Kabbara marshes.34  British development plans worked favorably for these citrus 
cultivators and the Palestinian landowners who had a stake in the commodification of land.35 
In urban areas, the hegemony of the Mandate incorporated many Palestinian Arabs based 
on their overt economic interests. Palestinian business leaders established a variety of industries 
and lobbied for economic protections to remain viable in the market. In the footwear industry, 
for instance, Palestinian business owners, along with Jewish business owners, sought economic 
protection as cheap European and Syrian footwear entered Palestine.36 Other Palestinian 
industries such as flower milling, soap making, and weaving expanded under the Mandate. 
“Between 1918 and 1927, Arabs and Jews established 2,269 commercial and manufacturing 
enterprises. Sixty percent of these enterprises were Arab.”37 Industrial Palestinian Arabs who 
accumulated capital under the Mandate were able to establish a degree of economic security. 
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From this position, the Palestinian business elites further invested in Arab industries, stored their 
wealth in Arab banks, and steered economic policy from numerous Chambers of Commerce.38 
The growth of industrial output was complemented by the growth of a professional class 
of Palestinian Arabs who acted as consumers. This professional class could also take advantage 
of new opportunities in the emerging urban civil society. Rapid economic growth, access to 
schools and higher education, and opportunities for administrative service created by the 
mandatory government contributed to the development of the middle class.39 This class of 
Palestinian Arabs increasingly participated in civil society organizations devoted to culture, 
literature, sports, and politics.40 They also took part in the growing consumer culture facilitated 
by newspapers such as Filastin.41 Thus, the positions, opportunities, and lifestyles of the urban 
professional class became increasingly connected to the political economy of the Mandate. 
Many leaders in the Palestinian, Jewish, and British communities collaborated, whether 
admittedly or not, to develop a functioning economy on which the British Mandate could be 
securely established. This was a result of the relationship between the world of production and 
the privileged classes in Palestine. These links formed the basis for the colonial state and its 
hegemony. However, it is important to note that the privatization of land in the Ottoman Middle 
East had been occurring for decades prior to the Mandate. This process greatly profited the Arab 
landowning elites, many of whom moved to the expanding cities. By the early 1900s, a 
privileged class of urban Arabs were engaged in commercial sectors of banking, trading, and 
shipping, as well as professional sectors like teaching, journalism, law, and civil service.42  
Regional economic development spurred the creation of an urban civil society that 
increasingly espoused liberal ideas and Arab nationalism by the late Ottoman period. These 
developments continued under the Mandate, which formalized the indigenous manifestations of 
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liberalism and commercialism within a political structure after the Ottoman collapse. As such, 
the political and economic systems of power that developed in Palestine were not simply 
imposed by the British onto Palestinian Arabs, but rather emerged through the cooperation of 
various parties within the broader political economy, including an elite stratum of Palestinian 
Arabs. Thus, the hegemony of the colonial state was made possible by the ensemble of actors 
within it and their connections to the world of production. 
During the period of the British Mandate, the process of intra-communal stratification 
amongst Palestinian Arabs deepened and produced a situation in which different classes of 
Palestinian Arabs enacted different forms of politics. Rural notables, religious functionaries, 
urban industrialists, and urban professionals produced a politics that reflected their relationship 
to the Mandate’s endeavor to build a functioning hegemony. As the situation in Palestine 
worsened during the 1930s, tensions intensified between the Palestinian Arab leadership and the 
British. Nationalist movements gained further traction. However, the content and activities of 
these nationalist movements varied greatly between Palestinian Arabs of different socioeconomic 
classes. Although all variants of nationalism in Palestine targeted the British for removal, some 
nationalist movements were more tepid than others. A look at the relationship between class, 
politics, and knowledge production will help elaborate this nationalist dynamic within Palestine. 
In the political sphere during the 1920s and 1930s, the British established or allowed the 
creation of Arab-led parties and institutions, giving privileged classes of Palestinian Arabs the 
opportunity to participate in the state’s project. Moreover, as the Mandate’s cultural hegemony 
was based on the discursive separation between Arabs, Jews, and British, the parties and 
institutions that both the British and Palestinian Arabs founded reflected this categorization. 
Arab nationalists such as Hamdi al-Husayni and Awni Abd al-Hadi created and led the popular 
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Istiqlal Party.43 Although the party denounced land sales to Zionists, al-Hadi had previously sold 
land to Jewish buyers.44 In 1921, the British created the Supreme Muslim Council which tended 
to religious matters such as monitoring shari’a courts, funding Islamic schools, and managing 
waqf land. Hajj Amin al-Husayni, of the traditional Arab nobility, was elected to the presidency 
of the Supreme Muslim Council. He was also appointed to the position of Grand Mufti of 
Jerusalem by the British in the same year. Hajj Amin al-Husayni derived much of his prestige 
from his material alliance with the Mandate.45 Additionally, the political institution of the Arab 
Higher Committee, also led by Hajj Amin al-Husayni, was established on April 25, 1936. 
Members of the Committee were mostly from the upper class who were less inclined to 
challenge the overall system of the Mandate. Out of the thirty-two members of the Arab Higher 
Committee, twenty-eight, or 87.5 percent, were from the upper class (landowners, big business 
owners, or traditional Arab notables). The other four members were from the professional class 
(urban professionals, shopkeepers, teachers, government clerks, religious functionaries). No 
members were from the urban working class or peasantry.46  Thus, the political leadership 
represented the interests of only a fraction of Palestinian Arabs. Their nationalism was linked to 
regional networks of educated and affluent Arabs as well as to the cultural hegemony of the 
Mandate that defined them based on their Arab ethnicity and Muslim religion.47 
In the private sphere, business leaders generated a discourse around their position and 
involvement within the political economy. By the early 1930s, economic growth stemming from 
cheap labor and surplus capital enlarged and entrenched the industrial class.48 Termed the “men 
of capital,” Palestinian Arab industrialists, merchants, bankers, and professionals in urban areas 
launched a journal called Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-‘arabiyya (the Arab Economic Journal) in the mid-
1930s.49 According to Sherene Seikaly, these men “sought to shape economics as a neutral and 
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scientific realm of nation building, to define class and status in new ways, and to safeguard their 
own power.”50 In the process of creating a neutral discourse to facilitate nation-building along 
Arab nationalist lines, these Palestinian Arab businessmen not only secured their own economic 
power but reified this power as natural. This process functioned alongside the spread of 
nationalism amongst middle-class consumers, who used their buying power to support the Arab 
nationalist cause.51 The newspaper Filastin intensified both middle-class consumption and Arab 
nationalism. The pages of their publications were splashed with Arab nationalist advertisements, 
which used the Arabic term watani (national) to describe Arab-made goods and products. 
National matches, national beds, national wheat, and national cement found their way onto the 
pages of Filastin.52  
In the realm of education, the British sought to incorporate into the hegemonic state the 
urban and affluent Palestinian Arabs, many of whom cooperated with the Mandate’s program. In 
1918, the British established the Arab College in Jerusalem to train teachers to work in Palestine. 
The education system employed professional teachers to teach in Arab villages and urban areas, 
as well as at the Arab College.53 There were two educational tracks for Palestinian Arabs: urban 
and rural. Providing an agriculturally based education for the rural Palestinians was a point on 
which many Palestinian Arabs could agree with the British. Humphrey Bowman, the director of 
education in Mandate Palestine, promoted this type of education for peasants and encouraged 
Palestinian peasants to stay on the land instead of moving to cities.54 Khalil Tota, the Palestinian 
director of the Arab College, concurred and explained how rural education should be agrarian 
based while education in the towns should be vocational rather than academic.55  
Many in the professional class of Palestinian Arabs may have had misgivings about the 
overall project of the Mandate, but because education was viewed as a liberating process, it was 
14 
 
often accessed and controlled by Palestinian Arabs who worked in conjunction with the British 
to establish a standardized education system. Although these developments brought standardized 
education to some Palestinian Arabs, the political infrastructure to incorporate peasants into civil 
society remained undeveloped. Palestinian Arabs who received English language skills in the 
cities could more easily advance in society, possibly securing a job within the mandatory 
government or traveling abroad for university education and/or employment. The peasantry did 
not receive the same education as urban Palestinian Arabs and, thus, could not access the 
language competency skills needed to become a member of civil society. They were left to 
perform their agrarian function under the hegemonic colonial state. This was where the peasantry 
was needed.56  
The politicking of and tacit cooperation between the British and the Palestinian Arab 
elites came at the expense of the struggling peasantry. Much of the peasantry had already been 
struggling since the late nineteenth century because of Ottoman tax policy and the intrigues of 
large landowners and moneylenders.57 As tensions between peasants and landowners continued 
under the Mandate, the peasants became increasingly indebted to the urban notables and were 
forced to repay their loans with inflated interest rates, some between thirty and sixty percent.58 
Additionally, mechanized tools and specialist knowledge available to the incoming Jewish 
farmers were not readily available to the Arab peasants, nor did the Arab landowners establish 
any means to acquire the new tools and information. The landowners did not share the deep, 
personal attachment to land that the peasants felt.59 As a result, many peasants saw their land 
holdings dwindle as their status moved from land proprietor to agricultural laborer.  
The material deterioration of the peasantry was solidified within the Mandate’s state 
hegemony through the process of capitalist development as well as the process of keeping the 
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peasantry on the land as peasants. Land scarcity produced higher land prices while population 
growth drove down the cost of labor. As peasants lost proprietorship of land and became an 
agricultural workforce, their renewed tenancy required that they use their own tools and 
knowledge while providing landowners with a rising percentage of crop yields. This landowning 
class was increasingly comprised of merchants, who could sell goods in local and regional 
markets.60 In addition to policies of state rationing of crops for villages, the practices of the 
education system outlined above helped to maintain the peasant physically and discursively. 
As for the peasantry’s response to this marginalization, the political economy proved to 
be a contributing factor. It produced certain forms of political activity that ranged greatly during 
the 1920s and 1930s. At times, Palestinian peasants waged small-scale fights by aiming their 
frustrations against local moneylenders or land managers. This was most likely the result of the 
musha’a land system, which had an atomizing effect on the villages and prevented any sort of 
wider, unified front against the large landowners, let alone the entire British Mandate and Zionist 
organizations. Some peasants also organized politically to obtain concessions from British 
officials.61 Their economic demands were evident at numerous times during this period. 
In addition to the economic factors that informed their responses, the peasantry’s social 
and political connections to networks of people who were not peasants themselves proved to be 
an important contributing factor in structuring their struggle. This can primarily be observed 
during the Great Revolt of 1936. In April 1936, the Arab Higher Committee called a general 
strike of Palestinian Arab workers. Soon after, local organizations sprang up in major towns and 
villages across Palestine, forming a network of locally managed institutions. These institutions 
collected taxes, secured weaponry for rebel fighters, provided medical and legal services, and 
supervised striking workers. Urban workers, merchants, business owners, students, and most 
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importantly poor and landless peasants combined efforts to make the rebel infrastructure 
function.62 One interesting example of this alliance involves Abd al-Rahim al-Hajj Muhammad, 
a descendant of a large landowning family who conducted business in the agricultural sector and 
was heavily involved in the peasant struggles against the British and Zionist through the rest of 
the revolt.63 Although the power of this movement came from rural Palestinian Arabs most 
negatively affected by the economy, the cross-class alliances that they and others forged were the 
bonds that made the rebel networks and, as an extension, the pressures exerted by the rebellion as 
a movement so powerful. These counterhegemonic efforts vigorously challenged the Mandate. 
Backlashes to the insurrection came from both the British as well as the Palestinian Arabs 
who were a part of the urban business class and nationalist leadership. Regarding the British, the 
revolt prompted swift and brutal intervention by the Mandate’s administration. These measures 
included devastating raids on homes and villages that resulted in the destruction of property, 
foodstuffs, and livestock, as well as the humiliation, beating, and killing of Palestinian Arabs.64 
The relatively quiescent period of colonial rule during the early 1930s gave way to the harsher 
exhibition of imperial domination once the hegemonic state was threatened from below.  
To facilitate the colonial counterinsurgency, the British utilized the relationships formed 
under the Mandate with the Palestinian Arab leadership. Although Hajj Amin al-Husayni 
espoused Arab nationalism and initially assumed leadership over the revolt, he was keenly aware 
that his social and political power partially derived from his alliance with the British. 
Furthermore, al-Husayni’s power also derived from his appropriation of the hegemonic discourse 
in both colonial and anti-colonial narratives that viewed social relations through a sectarian lens. 
In al-Husayni’s case, one can observe the entanglement of material gains acquired within the 
political economy of the Mandate and the social prestige wielded for a type of nationalism that 
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had its political limitations. For the Mufti, the insurrectionist challenge from below could only go 
so far. Thus, al-Husayni administered passive sermons, gave speeches calling for support from 
the Arab world, and instructed the public to refuse paying taxes as an alternative to violence, all 
while only mildly criticizing the British. While meeting with High Commissioner Wauchope in 
May 1936 to discuss options for handling the revolt, al-Husayni stated that the leadership needed 
to “find a formula that did not make them look weak in the eyes of the people.”65   
By October 1936, the economic conditions for Palestinian Arabs worsened and the death 
toll surpassed one thousand. The Arab Higher Committee and British officials sought to end the 
conflict. Finally, Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Arab representatives in the Arab Higher 
Committee accepted the plea from the Arab world and ended the revolt.66  In 1937, the rebellion 
moved to the rural areas and was picked up by a smaller fraction of inhabitants that became 
increasingly targeted by their own Palestinian neighbors who joined and organized peace bands 
to track down rebel fighters.67 It was during this second phase, which lasted until 1939, that Abd 
al-Rahim al-Hajj Muhammad was killed by the joint efforts of the British and Palestinian Arab 
peace bands. 
These complex alliances amongst Palestinian Arabs as well as between Palestinian Arabs 
and the British demonstrate the significance of political praxis in shaping society. As Joel Beinin 
emphasizes, social struggles have an impact on the reproduction of institutions and systems of 
power within the political economy. The struggle of the hegemonic bloc of actors to control the 
state, as Antonio Gramsci describes, can be met with the struggle of counterhegemonic forces 
from below. However, this challenge from below requires putting into practice the consciousness 
of one’s own marginalization. In this way, economic factors are not pure determinants in history. 
Active politics play a crucial role. These political formations make possible counterhegemonic 
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challenges. Although political activity is informed by the complex layering of class interests, 
political ideology, and cultural identity, the undeniable conflict between distinct socioeconomic 
classes of Palestinian Arabs during the Great Revolt contradicts the sectarian assumptions in 
contemporary nationalist narratives. Using Gramsci’s cultural hegemony as a framework to 
analyze Mandate Palestine reveals that stark sectarian divisions were neither innately absolute 
nor patently evident. Intra-communal conflicts based on competing interests within the political 
economy prove to be a more formative dynamic in this history. 
This paper has many implications on both the historiography on this subject and 
contemporary political movements.68 However, this research primarily strives to illuminate the 
historical subtleties that precluded the formation of an indigenous Palestinian nationalist 
movement centered around the concerns of the peasant majority. The deteriorating economic 
situation during the Mandate held the potential to spark such a movement, unifying all classes of 
Palestinian Arabs or even Palestinian Muslims and Jews. Although alliances such as these 
existed, they were not prominent enough to change the overall material conditions under the 
Mandate or to counter the cultural dichotomization in British, Arab, and Zionist discourses. 
Palestinian Arab elites could not be divorced from their material relationship to the Mandate and 
the political-social authority that such a relationship imparted. Their power developed through 
the intersection of political economy and culture, which was embedded within the structures of 
the colonial state. The web of power dynamics that pervaded the British Mandate factionalized 
the Palestinian Arab community and produced various political movements based on competing 
interests within the intra-communal hierarchy of Palestinian Arabs. As a result, by the end of the 
Great Revolt in 1939, the muddled and strained relations between Palestinian Arabs effectively 
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